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A B S T R A C T   
To protect and improve water quality in the Great Barrier Reef, the Queensland Government's Reef 2050 Water 
Quality Improvement Plan targets that 90% of sugarcane, horticulture, cropping and grazing lands in priority 
areas be managed using best management practices for sediment, nutrient and pesticides by 2025. Progress 
towards this target is insufficient and variable across catchments and industries. The motivation to adopt im-
provements in management practices is heavily influenced by social, economic, cultural and institutional di-
mensions. In this paper we synthesise the literature on how these human dimensions influence decision making 
for land management practice and highlight where future investment could be focussed. We highlight that 
focussing on —1) investigating systems to support landholder decision making under climate uncertainty (risk); 
2) generating a better understanding of the extent and drivers of landholder transaction cost; 3) understanding if 
there are competing ‘right’ ways to farm; and 4) improving understanding of the social processes, trust and 
power dynamics within GBR industries and what these means for practice change— could improve practice 
change uptake in the future.   
1. Introduction 
Human land use has a direct and, if unmanaged, potentially negative 
impact on water quality in terrestrial and marine environments. The 
international literature provides many examples of policies and pro-
grams implemented to influence land management for broader water 
quality benefits. These include programs to increase crop diversity and 
planting of cover crops in France (Chabe-Ferret and Subervie, 2013) and 
the United States (Talberth et al., 2015; Fleming et al., 2018), encourage 
‘set asides’ in riparian areas in Finland (Laukkanen and Nauges, 2014), 
apply alternative pesticide regimes in Ohio, United States (King et al., 
2012) and enable point to non-point source trades to achieve required 
reductions in nitrogen use in catchments to Lake Taupo, New Zealand 
(Duhon et al., 2011; Doole, 2012; Shortle, 2013; Duhon et al., 2015). 
Critical to the success of these programs in achieving their objectives is 
the recognition and understanding of the human elements that motivate 
or generate a barrier to improved land management and the design of 
policies and programs taking these into account (Floress et al., 2015). 
The World Heritage listed Great Barrier Reef (GBR), located off the 
coast of Queensland, Australia and covering an area of 344,400 km2, is 
the world's largest coral reef ecosystem (Australian Government, 2021). 
It is well known that the health of the GBR is in decline due to the col-
lective impact of land run-off associated with past and ongoing catch-
ment development, coastal development activities, extreme weather 
events and climate change impacts such as the 2016 and 2017 bleaching 
events (Schaffelke et al., 2017; Waterhouse et al., 2017; van Grieken 
et al., 2019; Taylor and Eberhard, 2020). The greatest water quality risks 
to the GBR are from diffuse source nitrogen, fine sediment and pesticide 
discharge generated from agricultural production in the GBR catch-
ments (Fig. 1) (Waterhouse et al., 2017); discharge of all of these pol-
lutants is many fold greater than under pre-European settlement 
(Schaffelke et al., 2017). To protect and improve water quality in the 
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Fig. 1. The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) location and catchments.  
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GBR, the Australian and Queensland Government, through the Reef 
2050 Water Quality Improvement Plan (WQIP), has established water 
quality improvement targets. These targets include a reduction in 
anthropogenic end of catchment loads of dissolved inorganic nitrogen 
(60% reduction by 2025); fine sediment (25% reduction by 2025); and 
particulate nutrient (20% reduction by 2025). To achieve these water 
quality targets, desirable land management practices have been articu-
lated for the management of sediments, nutrients, and pesticides across 
grazing, sugar cane, horticulture, bananas and broadacre cropping in-
dustries in GBR catchments (see Australian and Queensland Government 
(2020b, 2020a) for more detail on water quality risk frameworks and the 
development of desirable improved land management practice change). 
The WQIP also includes a target of 90% of land being managed following 
best management practices by 2025 (Thorburn and Wilkinson, 2013; 
Queensland Government, 2018). Given that the overall objective of the 
WQIP and associated programs is to improve land management prac-
tices, we refer to Improved Land Management Practices (ILMPs) in this 
paper rather than ‘best practice’. 
The latest report card for the GBR (https://www.reefplan.qld.gov. 
au/tracking-progress/reef-report-card/2017-2018) shows that land-
holder adoption of improved practices is insufficient, and variable across 
catchments and industries. Poor adoption by GBR landholders is detri-
mental to achieving end of catchment water quality improvement tar-
gets and long-term health of the GBR. But what motivates or creates a 
barrier for a landholder to improve their land management practices, 
especially when the benefits are often external to the property, such as 
the case with water quality? The focus of this paper is to begin to unpack 
this question. We do this through a review of the literature on the eco-
nomic, social, cultural and institutional processes (human dimensions)1 
behind adoption and especially as these relate to sugarcane growers and 
graziers within the GBR catchments. This paper consolidates literature 
on factors that influence land management decision making in the GBR 
Basin, which are often only discussed in isolation to one another. 
The paper is set out as follows. The method of literature review is 
outlined in Section 2. In Section 3 the concept of adoption as it relates to 
ILMPs for externally beneficial outcomes such as water quality is 
introduced. This is followed by the synthesis of current knowledge on 
how economic, social, cultural and institutional processes impact on 
practice change decision making broadly and specifically for sugarcane 
producers and graziers in GBR catchments. The convergence of the 
human dimensions and how they influence adoption of ILMPs is syn-
thesised in Section 4. Identification of current knowledge gaps occurs in 
Section 5 with conclusions in Section 6. 
2. Method 
The method used in this analysis can be best described as a system-
atic literature review, utilising a narrative synthesis and tabular 
accompaniment. According to Grant and Booth (2009), there are four-
teen types of literature review and associated methodologies. The 
appropriate literature review approach depends on many factors 
including the role of the review in the broader research, audience and 
timeframes for analysis (Knopf, 2006). We systematically searched for, 
appraised and synthesised research evidence with an analysis focussed 
on what is known, what is unknown, uncertainties and recommenda-
tions for future research (Grant and Booth, 2009). The primary data-
bases searched were Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar. Priority 
for inclusion was given to studies focusing on motivations and barriers 
to adoption of practices with water quality enhancing outcomes, with a 
further focus on studies that included direct references to economic, 
social, cultural and institutional factors. A secondary focus was given to 
empirical analysis in GBR catchments and then to the industries of focus. 
Other review type papers were included as part of this literature review. 
Empirical papers were restricted to be those published in the 10 years 
prior to the time of writing (2010− 2020). Review and theoretical papers 
were still included if outside of these time bounds. 
3. Adoption of Improved Land Management Practices (ILMPs) 
and the human dimensions of influence 
Pannell and Classen (2020) highlight that historically, adoption has 
been treated as a binary concept —there is adoption or there is no 
adoption. As a result, in many studies assessing adoption, the difference 
between complete, long term adoption and partial adoption (some of the 
property, some of the time), as well as the permanence of adoption 
(adoption whilst support continues) is not distinguished. Marra et al. 
(2003), Pannell and Classen (2020); Pannell et al. (2006); Tey and 
Brindal (2012), Weersink and Fulton (2020) and Montes de Oca Mungia 
et al. (2021) all highlight that adoption is non-binary and continuous. 
For example, a practice may be applied on some parts of the property 
only some of the time due to factors such as crop rotations, trialling, 
transaction costs to transition to full adoption, heterogeneity in land 
suitability, weather conditions. As a result, it is suggested in the litera-
ture that adoption, as it relates to ILMPs, is best understood as a dynamic 
learning process which proceeds via the following steps: 1) awareness of 
a problem or opportunity; 2) non-trial evaluation (looking over the 
fence, consultation or collaboration with neighbouring farms); 3) trial 
evaluation; 4) adoption; 5) review and modification; and 6) adaptation 
and expansion or non- or dis-adoption. 
Understanding landholder adoption of practice change has been the 
focus of production and institutional economists and social scientists for 
many years. Interest in adoption initially focussed on understanding low 
farm returns in an effort to improve agricultural productivity through 
the adoption of new practices. The focus of adoption study now includes 
a focus on supporting landholders in the adoption of land management 
practices that are deemed environmentally sustainable, either because 
they conserve resources that underpin agricultural productivity (such as 
maintaining soil quality) or generate external benefits (such as those 
that reduce pollution of waterways or enhance habitat for wildlife) 
(Pannell and Classen, 2020; Weersink and Fulton, 2020). With this shift 
comes the need to understand motivations or barriers to change beyond 
economics. Whilst still including economic motivations, the study of 
adoption has expanded to also value the broader human dimensions of 
social processes, culture and institutions. Each of these dimensions is 
introduced and discussed in the context of adoption of ILMPs for GBR 
sugarcane producers and graziers in the remainder of this section. The 
interaction of all the elements of human dimensions to influence the 
learning process of adoption is consolidated visually at the end of this 
section as Fig. 2. 
3.1. Human dimensions and understanding adoption of ILMPs 
3.1.1. Economic processes and ILMP adoption 
Weersink and Fulton (2020), following on from Pannell et al. (2006), 
suggest that the economic factors that impact on decisions about land 
management practice change relate to the extent of the establishment, 
opportunity and transaction cost relative to the short and long term 
benefit from the change. This is impacted on by the time lags to realise 
the benefit; the perceptions of uncertainty and risk; complexity; spill 
over impacts to other parts of the business; and other factors that 
generate utility such as environmental stewardship, work life balance 
(Weersink and Fulton, 2020) and farming system compatibility (Pannell 
et al., 2006). 
The economic factors can be grouped into those that influence the 
capacity to change (cost of change) and the motivation to change 
1 ‘Human dimensions’ is a term that emerged from the ecological sciences 
literature in reference to the human side of land management. Human di-
mensions are regularly referred to in the multi-disciplinary social sciences 
policy discussion related to GBR water quality. Human dimensions encapsulate 
the economics, social, cultural and institutional influences to human behaviour. 
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(relative advantage of changing – profit, alignment with broader goals). 
These are discussed as such below. 
3.1.1.1. Cost of change and ILMP adoption. The cost of changing to an 
ILMP includes the upfront capital cost, cost of missed opportunities 
(opportunity cost), transaction and transition costs. Capital costs are the 
costs of purchasing infrastructure such as fencing, watering points or 
machinery to implement the ILMP (Rolfe and Gregg, 2015) as well as the 
start-up capital and labour costs (Greiner and Gregg, 2011). Rolfe and 
Gregg (2015) and Greiner and Gregg (2011) both highlight that start-up 
capital costs are key barriers to the adoption of ILMPs such as pasture 
spelling, rotational grazing, sustainable stocking rates and river frontage 
management for graziers in GBR catchments. This is particularly the 
case for the management of river frontage and rotational grazing due to 
the cost of fencing and providing off-stream watering points. Rolfe and 
Gregg (2015) highlight that grazier perceptions of high start-up capital 
costs could be overcome through the use of one-off and upfront grants or 
tenders more so than incentive schemes that make payments based on 
outcomes over the long term. 
Capital costs have been recognised as a barrier to adoption of ILMPs 
by sugarcane growers in GBR catchments (van Grieken et al., 2019). The 
Australian Government's Reef Rescue (2008–2013) Program was 
designed to overcome this by paying a portion of the cost of capital 
invested to improve practices. However, the requirement to match the 
up-front capital program funds invested was found to be a barrier to 
adoption for many (van Grieken et al., 2013). 
Transaction costs are the indirect costs associated with the transfer of 
a good from one agent to another (Niehans, 1971). Transaction costs are 
incurred by landholders in the time and effort expended collecting in-
formation about practice change options and implications on their farm 
business (time to meet with consultants or do research on their own, 
consultant fees, fuel cost to travel to meetings or workshops) and in the 
time, effort and expenses incurred when conducting activities required 
by funding agencies (monitoring and reporting). Where assessed, land 
manager's private transaction costs when implementing agricultural or 
agri-environmental practices have been shown to be between 7% and 
Alignment with landholder goals 
/ intrinsic movaon 
Macro/instuonal (watershed, regional or naonal) scale
Farmer characteriscs – family 
and broader social environment 
and socio-cultural norms 
including experience, 
preferences, personal influences, 
awareness and interest in the 
pracce, mental health







Reason for holding land
Learning process to (DIS)ADOPTION





Adaptaon and expansion or Dis-
adopon/down scale
Characteriscs of the innovaon 
High establishment costs




Relave advantage with 
respect to profit
Micro/farm scale
Regulatory and market condions Biophysical seng
Climate
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Social processes such as:
Physical proximity to other adopters
Existence and strength of social networks (social identy)
Distance of property from the informaon source
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Cultural differences/ cultural symbolism
Recognion for efforts
Fig. 2. Framework for understanding the interactions of the human dimensions on adoption.  
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37% of any payment received to support the practice change (Falconer, 
2000; Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Vatn et al., 2002; Rorstad et al., 
2007; Mettepenningen et al., 2009; Coggan et al., 2013a). The vari-
ability in cost is most affected by the observability of the change (Ror-
stad et al., 2007). Coggan et al. (2014) demonstrated that, on average, 
the private and uncompensated transaction costs borne by sugarcane 
producers in Mackay Whitsunday catchments were equivalent to 38% of 
the funding received under Reef Rescue. In a study of graziers in GBR 
catchments by Rolfe and Star (2019), more than three quarters of par-
ticipants identified the largest perceived risk of entering a grant or 
tender scheme to improve water quality into the GBR was related to the 
paperwork associated with contractual arrangements (transaction cost). 
The impact of perceived and actual transaction costs on adoption of 
ILMPs by GBR landholders is not well known. This is particularly the 
case for grazing. 
3.1.1.2. Relative advantage and ILMP adoption. Relative advantage is 
influenced by the profit, complexity and risks associated with the change 
(and how these are managed), and any spill over impacts to other parts 
of the farm business. Standard economic models historically used to 
assess adoption typically assumed that a farmer's motivation is to 
maximise profit, expected profit or expected utility (Weersink and Ful-
ton, 2020). Lankester et al. (2009) suggest that this is particularly the 
case when agricultural production is the main land use and the sole 
income source of landholders. 
Studies that explore economic processes as an influencing factor on 
adoption also tend to be geographically and/or practice specific. For the 
GBR, Roebeling et al. (2009) assessed the cost to sugarcane growers and 
graziers of adopting practices to improve water quality. They showed 
that significant water quality improvements can be obtained by sugar 
producers at negative cost (i.e., for a profit) to a point (35% reduction in 
total suspended solids and 50% reduction in dissolved inorganic nitro-
gen). This is the case for practices that involve reduced or zero tillage, 
economically efficient rates of fertiliser application, nitrogen replace-
ment and split nitrogen application. However, modelling sugarcane 
farms in the Wet Tropics, Kandulu et al. (2018) find that switching ni-
trogen application from maximizing private to maximizing public 
benefit (including impacts on carbon emissions) could reduce expected 
private net returns by $99/ha but yield additional external environ-
mental benefits of $191/ha. Further switching nitrogen application from 
maximizing private return in years of highest profit potential to maxi-
mizing mean social net returns could reduce expected private profits in 
good years by $277/ha but yield additional external environmental 
benefits equal to $287/ha. 
Roebeling et al. (2009) found that all ILMPs for grazing came at a 
cost to the grazier. However, Star et al. (2015) reports that landholder 
optimism related to future weather patterns impacts on perceptions of 
the potential of practice change to generate net private returns. Star 
et al. (2015) suggest that grazier adoption of improved management 
practices could be enhanced by reducing weather uncertainty in deci-
sion making through improvements in spatially specific forecasting of 
future weather patterns and their production implications. 
3.1.1.3. Other factors that impact on perception of relative advantage of 
ILMPs. A landholder's perception about the relative advantage of an 
ILMP is also affected by their perception of risk and uncertainty. This is 
well covered for grazing by Greiner et al. (2009); Greiner and Gregg 
(2011); Moon et al. (2012); Greiner (2015) and Rolfe and Gregg (2015) 
and for sugarcane by Benn et al. (2010); Kandulu et al. (2018); Rust 
(Pending) and Thorburn et al. (2020). For graziers in the Burdekin and 
other northern Australian catchments, pasture levels and growth, mar-
ket prices for beef and annual rainfall were the aspects of risk that had a 
high impact on decision making (Rolfe and Gregg, 2015). Grazier 
perception of risk surrounding ILMPs and climate could be further 
ameliorated by investing in demonstration sites that allow landholders 
to see the impacts of dry season management (Star et al., 2019). Star 
et al. (2019) also assess the impact of input (cost to conduct works are 
higher than expected) and outcome risk (works fail to achieve the 
outcome) in grazier decision making surrounding gully remediation. 
Star et al. (2019) found that outcome risk (which did not include pro-
duction risk) had a greater bearing on participation than input risk. It is 
thought that this may be because landholders are intrinsically motivated 
to protect the environmental values of their land (corresponding to the 
findings of Greiner et al. (2009); Greiner and Gregg (2011); and Rolfe 
and Gregg (2015)). Other driving factors may be that landholders are 
reluctant to see a project fail (reputational risk); they do not want to risk 
having a long term legacy of a gully in a worse state, particularly if they 
intend to pass the property on to younger members of the family. 
Landholders are also concerned about the management of the gully 
remediation in years of lower than average summer rainfall; and/or the 
risk of more regulation as a result of project failure. 
Focussing on sugarcane production, Rust (Pending) highlights that 
financial risk associated with new production technologies is an 
important factor in decision making surrounding adoption. Rust 
(Pending) highlights that Australian sugarcane growers are price takers 
on the international market which means they face substantial risk to the 
value of farm production if there are adverse commodity price move-
ments. Risk exposure due to being price takers is reported to impact on 
decisions about trialling new technologies or land management tech-
niques, especially if they require substantial capital investment. Thor-
burn et al. (2020) highlight that sugarcane farmers manage production 
risk through the application of nitrogen. This is supported by Kandulu 
et al. (2018) who calculated that the long-term economically optimal 
rate of nitrogen fertiliser (N) application on sugarcane in the Tully sub- 
catchment of the Wet Tropics was 120 kg/ha. This is significantly lower 
than the optimal rate of N application when inter-year variations in 
profits are taken into account and risk exposure to expected returns in 
good years is optimised (150 kg/ha). Given low fertiliser cost as a per-
centage of expected returns, and tending to be averse to missing out on a 
high yielding crop, applying high N rates presents a low risk proposition 
in the face of high profit potential (Kandulu et al., 2018). Kandulu et al. 
(2018) also note that sugarcane growers make decisions at the beginning 
of the season with little knowledge of future economic or seasonal 
conditions. Accordingly, selecting appropriate N fertiliser application 
rates could be enhanced with improvements in seasonal climate fore-
casting coupled with risk-based assessment of expected returns although 
the practical application of this concept is complex and not readily 
accepted by sugarcane farmers (Thorburn et al., 2011b). 
Given that many sugarcane growers apply nitrogen fertiliser in 
excess of crop needs to minimise the risk that crop yield is limited by the 
availability of nitrogen in the soil, Thorburn et al. (2020) asked whether 
insurance, rather than overapplication of N fertiliser might be an 
effective risk management tool. They showed that this was possible, 
although they had to develop an original insurance product concept for 
the problem as there were no relevant existing insurance products. The 
risks of yield loss, and hence the price of insurance were highly het-
erogeneous. However, there were situations where the cost of insurance 
was less than the cost savings from reduced fertiliser and thus pur-
chasing insurance was an economically rational risk management 
approach. There also might be situations where insurance is attractive, 
even if economically irrational, such as where farmers have to reduce N 
fertiliser applications to meet government regulations where they 
believe above-regulated applications are needed to maintain 
production. 
Despite the focus on profit and cost, Greiner and Gregg (2011) sug-
gest that intrinsic motivation, that is motivation to do an action because 
it makes you feel good, is a strong motivator for grazier investment in 
ILMPs in GBR catchments. This is particularly the case for low cost 
ILMPs. Greiner and Gregg (2011) note that care should be taken when 
engaging financial incentives for land management practices such that 
they do not ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation. There is some evidence that 
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some landholders may feel insulted if they are paid to do something that 
they consider of social value (Greiner and Gregg, 2011). Financial in-
centives could also create a situation where landholders delay con-
ducting activities in case they might be paid for these in the future. 
3.1.2. Social processes 
Social processes primarily influence adoption through their impact 
on landholders' motivation to change (Weersink and Fulton, 2020). 
Social processes are described as: the existence and strength of social 
networks (family through to community); the physical proximity of 
other adopters (due to observability and trialability) and information 
sources; the history of relationships between landholders and those with 
the information; and ethnic and cultural associations (Pannell et al., 
2006; Weersink and Fulton, 2020). 
3.1.2.1. Social networks and social learning. Social networks, the in-
teractions and personal relationships between people, have the greatest 
bearing on the learning process regarding the adoption of an ILMP at the 
problem identification and non-trial of solutions phase. This is because 
social networks influence landholder perception of the existence of a 
problem to begin with and then allow landholders to learn socially by 
‘looking over the fence’ and observing others conducting small scale 
solution trials (Streletskaya et al., 2020; Weersink and Fulton, 2020). 
However, the role of the social network in social learning is weaker 
when the profitability of the technology depends on characteristics that 
vary across the population of potential adopters (Chavas and Nauges, 
2020). Heterogeneity in agriculture amongst family farmers and farms 
tends to be high which impedes the potential for social learning 
(Benyishay and Mobarak, 2019). 
Based on their study into drivers of adoption of riparian management 
by graziers in the Burdekin, Lankester et al. (2009) suggest that knowing 
what works well and why through more thorough and collaborative 
monitoring and evaluation of implemented practices would help the 
cycle of social learning with the potential for greater adoption. Star et al. 
(2019) also suggest that to capitalise on social learning of graziers, trials 
need to be designed with a focus on management practice techniques 
that are most relevant to common perceptions of risk. 
Social learning with regard to ILMP is challenging in situations 
where problems that ILMPs are addressing are not perceived to be overly 
important to the landholders that need to adopt the ILMPs or there is a 
perception they will negatively influence the profitability of their farm 
businesses. For example, in the sugarcane industry the application of 
nitrogen fertiliser to increase crop vigour and greenness is commonplace 
and reductions in rates of application can be perceived to be extremely 
detrimental to industry and farm productivity. As such, work to co- 
develop decision support tools with sugarcane farmers and collabora-
tive water quality monitoring programs are two forms of activity that 
have been conducted to help maintain productivity, at the same time 
increasing awareness of the environmental consequences of over-
application of nitrogen fertiliser (Thorburn et al., 2011b). In this 
manner, the social group norms within leading farmers and their peers 
are beginning to shift so that conversations about how to experiment 
with ILMP that reduce nitrogen fertiliser use are seen as important to the 
future of their farms and the broader industry (Vilas et al., 2020). 
Social norms and social identity involve membership in emotionally 
significant groups. Where landholders are acutely aware of social norms 
and identity they will judge their own behaviour referenced to the 
behaviour of their peer group (Ferraro et al., 2019). In lab-based ex-
periments, non-point source pollution management programs could 
reduce (theoretical) pollution, drawing on social identity and presenting 
information to potential participants about decisions made by others 
like them in a similar situation. There is also evidence of policies that 
draw on social identity operating on the ground. For example, Minne-
sota's Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program allow farmers to 
display a sign to recognise their farm as water quality friendly once they 
have adopted a core set of practices (Ferraro et al., 2019). There are also 
examples of this for the sugar growing community of the GBR through 
Cane Changer– a program which set out to generate a positive social 
identity for sugarcane farmers through record keeping and stem nega-
tivity directed towards sugarcane farmers through the signing of a 
behaviour contract which recognised farmers for their environmental 
stewardship. Sugarcane farmers were then comfortable to sign their own 
behaviour contracts to improve farming practices (Pickering et al., 
2018). It is important to note that the effectiveness of any approach to 
learning about ILMPs will be influenced by the nature of the people to be 
influenced. Taylor and Van Grieken (2015) found that production 
orientated sugarcane growers did not like the articulation of farming 
practices linked to GBR water quality issues. 
Fielding et al. (2008) demonstrate the importance of norms on 
behaviour when assessing landholder adoption of riparian zone man-
agement. They found that graziers who perceived that other landholders 
in their community were more approving of (injunctive norms) and 
more likely to engage in (descriptive norms) riparian zone management, 
were more likely to intend to engage in riparian zone management 
themselves. However, this was only significant for landholders who 
strongly identified with their landholder community group. That is, the 
behaviour and expectations of a behaviourally relevant reference group 
were more motivating than global perceptions of support from impor-
tant others. Getting visible and respected in-group members who have 
similar farming practices (see Benyishay and Mobarak (2019)) to pro-
mote practices may therefore be one way to influence in-group mem-
bers. Communicating information about the behaviour and practices of 
in-group members is another possible strategy. Emtage and Herbohn 
(2012) and Pickering et al. (2018) highlight that the credibility of the 
information source and the trust in who delivers the information will 
impact on the uptake of the information in adoption decision making. 
Benyishay and Mobarak (2019) suggest that communication of results 
could be enhanced through the use of a performance bonus based on 
knowledge change and adoption. 
3.1.3. Culture 
Culture is broadly defined as a set of basic assumptions and values, 
orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural con-
ventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do 
not determine) each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of 
the ‘meaning’ of other people's behaviour (Spencer-Oatey, 2008). 
Cultural capital is the resources in the form of knowledge, skills, 
dispositions and possession of culturally significant artefacts (Burton 
and Paragahawewa, 2011). Cultural capital is important because it 
generates symbolic capital which then strengthens social relations 
(Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011), generating status and peer esteem. 
Cultural capital may be institutionalised (qualifications or standardised 
recognition – for example, industry sanctioned young farmer of the 
year), objectified (new farm equipment or a well-tended ‘tidy’ field) or 
embodied (learned skill and knowledge – he/she knows how to manage 
farm dogs). 
Blackstock et al. (2010) note that farmers attach symbolic meaning 
to the choices that they make and the behaviours they exhibit. Further, 
farmer decision making is a complex process involving multiple criteria 
which is strongly influenced by peers. If the interpretation of ‘good 
farming’ is associated with high productivity and high yields, then 
persuading farmers to conduct activities that are counter to this position 
will be very difficult. Farmers allocate each other ‘symbolic capital’ for 
visible demonstration of values. Schemes that undermine these visible 
symbols of ‘good farming’ (buffer strips for habitat which may be seen as 
overgrown and untidy) may be less effective than those that contribute 
to signs of good farming (new fences). Different sub-cultural groups in 
agricultural communities have a different perception of good, best and 
proper farming (Blackstock et al., 2010). The impact of this is magnified 
due to the fact that farming decisions can often be publicly viewed by a 
peer group that is highly judgemental and critical, particularly of 
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practices that fall outside standard production orientated farming 
(Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). Conventional farmers around the 
world are known to dislike untidy farming (perceived as a lack of 
straight crop lines or hedge rows with undergrowth etc.) (Burton and 
Paragahawewa, 2011). Untidy farming is seen as inefficient with pro-
duction wasted due to the inability to apply the correct fertilisers and 
pesticides at the right time, plough straight etc. (Burton and Para-
gahawewa, 2011). Roadside farming means that farmers can judge each 
other from a distance; however, complex landscapes which support 
biodiversity cannot be easily read from the roadside. 
In the GBR catchments, Taylor and Eberhard (2020) note that beef 
producers in the Burdekin rangelands report a ‘loss of pride related to 
receiving handouts’ whilst Lankester et al. (2009) note that landholder 
‘concern about how others see riparian management’ is important in 
participation decisions. Taylor and Van Grieken (2015) highlight that 
when sugarcane growers feel that incentive programs reward poor 
growers rather than recognising those that are more progressive, 
participation will remain low. Greiner and Gregg (2011) argue that a 
financial focus to conservation programs has crowded out stewardship 
focussed motivation, and, combined with a landholder cynicism towards 
government, has reduced participation in programs in high priority re-
gions such as the Burdekin. 
Understanding culture may provide insight into whether a policy or 
program will be successful in the short or long term. If adoption of ILMPs 
requires a shift in culture, it may take a long time for large scale adoption 
to occur, if it ever does. At the same time, adoption by lead farmers can 
begin to shift the conversation with others which may help increase the 
scale of adoption. Initiatives that publicly recognise land management 
practice change are seeking to modify the culture around visible symbols 
of ‘good’ farming. 
3.1.4. Macro/institutional influences 
Stuart and Gillon (2013), Liu et al. (2018), Baur (2020), Bennett et al. 
(2018) and Taylor and Eberhard (2020) add further context to the work 
of Pannell and others by highlighting that in addition to social and 
cultural processes and economic drivers, a number of factors external to 
the farmer and the farm operation impact on adoption. These are 
referred to as macro-scale or institutional influences and include 
changes in factors such as agricultural policies, standards (such as food 
quality standards), market conditions and the biophysical setting. 
Institutions are the humanly devised rules designed, developed and 
enforced by society which structure economic, social and political 
behaviour and thereby shape interaction (Bromley, 1989; North, 1990; 
Bromley, 1991). Regulatory institutions tend to be coercive and are the 
highly visible social processes of making rules, monitoring behaviour 
and implementing incentives to encourage compliance. Transgressing 
regulatory institutions results in punishment or loss of reward. Norma-
tive institutions are softer and exert pressure for behaviour through 
social obligation, peer expectation or standards of appropriate behav-
iour rather than enforcement. Transgressing normative institutions re-
sults in shame, loss of standing or social exclusion. Cultural-cognitive 
institutions are the patterns of thinking, feeling and acting that operate 
at a ‘taken for granted’ level and shape shared understanding of how the 
world works and how collective meaning is produced. Transgressing 
cultural-cognitive constraints results in confusion or disorientation 
(Scott, 2013). 
Baur (2020) categorises five types of institutional carrier that 
constrain or drive landholder decision making around land management 
(Table 1). Baur (2020) also notes that biophysical aspects of land and 
climate, soil fertility and health, pest pressure, cropping decisions and 
pathogen loading, property rights, land values and farm loan conditions 
impact on farmer land management decision making. Baur (2020) notes 
the complexities brought to land management decision making about 
the ‘right’ way to farm by conflicting institutions around food safety and 
environmental outcomes in the United States. Taylor and Eberhard 
(2020), specifically related to the GBR, highlight the conflicting signals 
given to land managers from production versus environmental in-
stitutions. For example, in the sugarcane industry, awards are given for 
record high yields (Walker, 2019). Yet meeting GBR water quality tar-
gets may require farmers to management their crops in such a way that 
small reductions in yield is more common (Thorburn et al., 2011a). 
Whilst considered critical to understanding adoption, there is very 
little analysis of how institutional factors impact on adoption and how 
these can be best utilised to support increased adoption. Drawing on Liu 
et al. (2018), Baur (2020) highlights this, noting that out of 121 papers 
on adoption of agricultural and agri-environmental best management 
practices, only 7 addressed macro factors and out of these, only 2 
assessed the role of over-arching policies, markets, businesses or 
agencies on land management decision making. 
4. A framework for thinking about the human dimensions 
influencing on adoption 
In Section 3, we describe the numerous human dimensions that in-
fluence adoption of ILMPs. However, we need to understand how they 
interact to develop better programs to facilitate adoption of ILMP. Fig. 2 
synthesises existing literature and provides a visual framework 
describing the relationships between the direct and indirect human 
dimension influences on the non-binary and continuous learning process 
of adoption. In summary, the interest/ability of a landholder to move 
along the learning process to some level of adoption is influenced by the 
social and cultural characteristics, demographic and situational char-
acteristics of the landholders, and the economic characteristics of the 
innovation which generate relative advantage (Pannell et al. (2006); 
Montes de Oca Mungia et al. (2021)). Dis-adoption can also be explained 
through relative advantage where the same influences can negatively 
affect the adoption process, for example decisions to adopt rely both on 
the credibility of the product but also on cognitive and normative 
Table 1 
Baur's five types of institutional carrier which constrain or drive landholder 
decision making.  
Institutional carrier Description 
Rules and standards: Preventative intent. 
Markets and supply chain 
forces: 
Land uses may be promoted or limited by 
production costs, prices, market access and 
exclusion. Some examples of this include organic 
production, non-GMO seed, labels and 
certifications, production contracts between 
growers and buyers which specify production 
method. 
Legal liability: Reactive regulatory institution that discourage 
socially undesirable behaviour by punishing after 
the fact 
Social networks and norms: Norms emerge, persist and adapt through webs of 
interpersonal relationships. Social networks 
regulate information and resource flows to farmers, 
circumscribing a farmer's opportunity space. 
Norms shape farmer interpretation and response to 
other institutions. Policies that NUDGE farmers in a 
way that respects existing information networks 
are more effective than policies that BUDGE 
farmers out of familiar relationships of trust and 
realms of experience Baur (2020).a 
Scientific knowledge and 
available technologies: 
Frame what is possible. Farmers are more receptive 
when expert or knowledge making institutions 
speak to both the societal importance and 
feasibility of adoption. Farmers tend to have a 
negative view of practices that complicate 
operations or challenge technical beliefs  
a A nudge is a concept in behavioural economics, political theory and 
behavioural sciences which proposes positive reinforcement and indirect sug-
gestion as a way to influence behaviour. To be considered a nudge, the inter-
vention must be cheap and easy to avoid. Fruit placed at eye level is a nudge 
whilst banning junk food is not (and probably could be considered a budge). 
Source: Baur (2020). 
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influences (Moore, 2002; Hay, 2018). In Fig. 2, shaded boxes indicate a 
direct link to the learning process supporting adoption whilst unshaded 
boxes indicate an indirect link. For example, the cost, benefit, risk, spill 
over impacts to other parts of the farm business and uncertainties of a 
practice all influence the relative advantage of the ILMP which will then 
in turn influence practice adoption (or extent). In Fig. 2, heavy dashed 
outlines on boxes indicate categorisation as relevant ‘social’ human di-
mensions (cultural dimensions are inlcuded within this category) and 
heavy dotted outlines indicate categorisation as relevant ‘economic’ 
human dimensions. The heavy solid lined boxes in Fig. 2 indicate the 
‘institutional’ human dimension. 
5. Where should future research in this area focus? 
Based on the review of the literature focussed on human dimensions 
and adoption of ILMPs broadly and with specific focus on sugarcane and 
grazing landholders in GBR catchments there are three key areas for 
future research to support ILMP adoption. These areas include barriers 
to adoption (specifically landholder perception and actions associated 
with risk) and two areas where better understanding of the current 
human environment could enhance motivation for ILMP adoption. 
These relate to social connectedness and the role of institutions in 
framing opportunities for landholders. A summary of key findings and 
current gaps in knowledge is provided in Table 2. 
5.1. Overcoming the barrier of risk 
A common theme throughout the general and GBR focussed litera-
ture was landholder reluctance to adopt ILMPs or even become involved 
in programs promoting ILMPs due to perceived risks. Perceived risks 
relate to climate, on-ground outcome, social and reputational domains. 
5.1.1. Climate risk 
It is well articulated in the literature that landholders are accustomed 
to, and influenced by, their perception of climate risk. A number of 
studies highlight areas where better information about climate could 
influence landholder decision making around ILMPs. Star et al. (2015) 
suggest that grazier adoption of ILMPs could be enhanced through im-
provements in spatially specific forecasting of future weather patterns. 
Better forecasting could further influence adoption if this was easily 
understood in terms of production implications. Seasonal climate fore-
casting related to production and expected returns has also been rec-
ognised as influential to decision making around nitrogen application 
rates for sugarcane producers. 
5.1.2. Outcome, social and reputation risk 
Outcome risk refers to the risk that on-ground actions made by 
farmers (such as filling in gullies or implementing an improved fertiliser 
regime) fail to achieve the expected outcome. In some circumstances, 
outcome risk (which did not include production risk) had a greater 
bearing on participation than input risk. Greater understanding of the 
type of outcome risk perceived by landholders matched to landholder 
type and ILMP could assist in managing outcome risk and improving 
uptake. 
Transaction costs can also be a form of outcome risk. Particularly 
when landholders are reluctant to become involved in programs sup-
porting ILMP adoption due to a perception of high levels of paperwork 
which could come their way once they are engaged (Rolfe and Star, 
2019). There is some understanding of the extent of transaction costs 
incurred by sugarcane farmers in ILMP engagement (see Coggan et al. 
(2013b)) but no literature reporting the drivers of perceived transaction 
costs nor the actual transaction costs incurred by graziers as they adopt 
ILMP with or without government support. Understanding what gen-
erates the perception of high transaction costs and determining how this 
aligns with reality is valuable when designing programs that seek to 
engage with landholders to enhance ILMP adoption. 
Table 2 
Key findings about influences on ILMP adoption and future research focus.   
Key finding about influence on 
ILMP adoption 
Potential future focus 
Climate uncertainty (risk generally) 
Grazing Climate uncertainty impacts on 
understanding of future 
profitability of practices 
Could (and how could) climate 
forecasting reduce risk related 
to ILMPs? How might this be 
designed and integrated into 
ILMPs? 
Are demonstration sites best 
designed to ameliorate risk 
perceptions related to climate 
and production? 
Sugarcane Sensitive to yield variability 
which is more related to climate 
than nitrogen application 
What is the potential (supply 
and demand) for technology (e. 
g. climate forecasting) to help 
farmers better understand and 
manage climate risk?  
Transaction costs (economic) 
Grazing Perception of high transaction 
costs associated with engaging 
in grants and tenders for land 
management change. 
What is driving this perception? 
Does this perception match 
reality? If yes, what can be done 
to reduce risk? 
What support can be 
established to reduce actual 
and/or perceived costs?  
Perceived and actual outcome/output risk (economic) 
Grazing High perceived risk related to 
outcomes from ILMP 
implementation 
What is driving this perception 
(eg fear of regulation if 
voluntary actions fail)? 
What is the impact of 
reputational risk on landholder 
decision making? 
What program design 
initiatives can be incorporated 
to manage output and 
reputational risk? 
Sugarcane Growers tend to value a few 
bumper crops more than 
avoiding many smaller losses 
and manage the risk of climate 
on this through nitrogen 
application often in excess of 
crop need. An insurance 
product is being considered as 
an alternative for how farmers 
manage upside risk. 
Would and how would a 
regional champion for an 
insurance product create 
product trust and product 
viability? 
What are the implications for 
upstream and downstream 
industries, and how might these 
be managed?  




Social networks and learning 
are most important in the 
awareness and learning phases 
to adoption. 
Do positive (for good 
environmental outcomes) 
social networks exist in key 
industries in GRB catchments? 
What group dynamics, trust 
and power relationships exist 
between landholders? 
Is learning transferable (what is 
the impact of heterogeneity on 
learning and what are the 
implications for scheme 
design?) 
Emotional ties to a 
behaviourally relevant 
reference group influence 
action 
What is the potential benefit of 
getting visible and respected in- 
group members with relatable 
farming practices to promote 
practices? How will this be 
achieved? 
What is the potential for a 
performance bonus for 
knowledge transfer and 
adoption improve adoption (or 
alternative strategies)? 
What is the impact on 
effectiveness of starting with a 
bonus and losing it versus the 
(continued on next page) 
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5.2. Capitalising on social connection 
Social processes are highlighted in the literature as having a signif-
icant bearing on the adoption of ILMPs by landholders. Social networks 
and interactions are particularly important during the early phases of 
learning about ILMPs, especially when ILMPs are difficult to trial and 
lessons from trials are transferable. More knowledge regarding the in-
tricacies of the social networks of sugarcane growers and graziers in GBR 
catchments could facilitate better design and targeting of ILMP adoption 
support structures. Specific gaps remain around understanding the 
interaction between social capital and trust and how these interactions 
impact on perceived power dynamics, social learning and the process of 
(non) adoption. How these interactions inform policy design and how 
this might be trialled in the future are also recognised as current infor-
mation gaps. 
5.3. Institutions creating competition over the ‘right’ way to farm 
Whilst there is good understanding of the role of institutions gener-
ally, and how these govern the way landholders behave in catchments 
such as the GBR, little investigation has been conducted to assess if and 
how institutions create conflicts for landholders surrounding the ‘right’ 
or ‘best’ way to farm. As institutions encompass all interactions and are 
constantly in flux, this understanding is critical to the design of policies 
and programs for supporting adoption of ILMPs. 
6. Conclusion 
The adoption of ILMPs by landholders is critical to the achievement 
of any level of water quality improvement targets that counter terrestrial 
runoff. Further, when the benefits generated by the behaviour change 
are external to the landholders who change behaviour, understanding 
motivations and barriers to adoption including and beyond economics is 
critical to supporting ILMP adoption. In this paper we highlight how the 
human dimensions of economic, social, cultural and institutional pro-
cesses interact and influence the learning process to adoption of ILPMs. 
Further, we highlight what is known about the role these dimensions 
have at different parts of the learning process to adoption of ILMPs 
especially related to sugarcane and grazing in GBR catchments. With 
significant investment still occurring to support landholders adopt 
ILMPs in GBR catchments we highlight the need to invest in: 1) systems 
to support landholder decision making under climate uncertainty (risk); 
2) better understanding of the extent and drivers of landholders trans-
action cost and processes to reduce these; 3) improved understanding of 
competing ‘right’ ways to farm, the impact this is having on land man-
agement decisions and ways to seamlessly dismantle these; and 4) 
improved understanding of the social processes, trust and power dy-
namics and what these means for ILMP adoption and support towards 
this. Broader understanding of human dimensions and adoption in other 
contexts and other countries would also be beneficial. 
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